IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MALAYSIA
THE PALACE OF JUSTICE PUTRAJAYA
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. N-09-17-2005
Respondent ISHAK BIN HJ SHAARI
NOTICE OF MOTION
ISHAK BIN HJ SHAARI
[In the matter of the High Court of Malaya at Seremban Criminal
Appeal No. 42-7-2000
Appellant Ishak bin Hj Shaari
Respondent Public Prosecutor]
[In the matter of the Sessions Court of Seremban Arrest Case
Ishak bin Hj Shaari]
LOW HOP BING, JCA MOHD HISHAMUDIN YUNUS, JCA ZAHARAH IBRAHIM, JCA
DISSENTING JUDGMENT OF MOHD HISHAMUDIN YUNUS, JCA
By notice of motion the respondent (Ishak bin Hj Shaari) applies to this Court to exercise it powers of review to review a decision of the Court of Appeal dated 13 October 2008.
On 13 October 2008 the Court of Appeal had allowed the Public Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of the High Court of Seremban of 26 January 2005.
Earlier, what had happened was, on 27 January 2000 the Sessions Court of Seremban had convicted the respondent on the offence of rape of a minor under section 376 of the Penal Code and had sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment and 5 strokes of whipping. He appealed to the High Court of Seremban. On 26 January 2005 the High Court of Seremban allowed his appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court, the Public Prosecutor appealed to the Court of Appeal. On 13 October 2008 the Court of Appeal allowed the Public Prosecutor’s appeal and set aside the order of the High Court, and restored the conviction recorded by the Sessions Court as well as the sentence imposed by the said Court. In our legal system, as the appeal emanates from a judgment of a subordinate court (in the present case, a Sessions Court) there is no further recourse to the Federal Court. In other words, for this
particular judgment of the High Court of Seremban, should any party be aggrieved by the judgment, the Court of Appeal is the court of last resort.
In applying to this Court to exercise its power of review to review the earlier decision of this Court, Encik Karpal Singh, the learned counsel for the applicant/respondent, contends that the decision of the Court of Appeal of 13 October 2008, in allowing the Public Prosecutor’s appeal, had failed to give due consideration to certain evidence, and hence a miscarriage of justice had been occasioned by that decision.
At the commencement of the hearing of this motion, the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor, Encik Awang Armadajaya, raises a preliminary objection and that is that a Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction or power to review its own previous decision. The learned DPP relied mainly on the judgment of Mohd Ghazali Yusoff FCJ in the recent Federal Court case of Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. PP  7 CLJ 397.
The learned DPP also refers to art. 121 of the Federal Constitution
and section 50 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and argues that there is nothing in either article 121 or section 50 that specifically confers on the Court of Appeal any inherent power to review its own previous decision.
It has been agreed by the parties that this Court shall at this stage of the hearing of the motion only confine itself to hearing the preliminary objection of the Public Prosecutor, and shall make a ruling solely on the issue raised in the preliminary objection. In the event this Court were to rule on the preliminary objection in favour of the Public Prosecutor (in other words in the event that this Court were to uphold the preliminary objection) then this Court will proceed to dismiss the notice of motion. On the other hand, in the event the preliminary objection is dismissed, then this Court will proceed to hear the substantive motion of the applicant on its merits.
Now, having had the benefit of considering the submissions of the applicant and the respondent, both written and oral, I am dismissing
this preliminary objection, and I shall now proceed to give my grounds.
There have already been two previous judgments of the Court of Appeal that ruled that the Court of Appeal has the inherent power to review its own previous decision under exceptional circumstances in order to prevent an injustice being occasioned or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court, particularly where the previous decision was made by the Court of Appeal sitting as a Court of last resort. They are –
(1) Ramanathan a/l Chelliah v Public Prosecutor  6 MLJ 215; and
(2) PP v. Abdullah Idris  5 CLJ 445.
In Ramanathan members of the panel were Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was), Hasan Lah JCA and Jeffrey Tan JCA. Gopal Sri Ram JCA, in delivering the unanimous judgment of the Court, said (at p. 218):
 We will take the question of jurisdiction first. It is now settled that the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to review its own decision in a given case. See, Taylor v. Lawrence  EWCA Civ 90, where it was held as follows:
The Court of Appeal had a residual jurisdiction to reopen an appeal which it had already determined in order to avoid real injustice in exceptional circumstances. The court had implicit powers to do that which was necessary to achieve the dual objectives of an appellate court, namely to correct wrong decisions so as to ensure justice between the litigants involved, and to ensure public confidence in the administration of justice, not only by remedying wrong decisions, but also by clarifying and developing the law and setting precedents. A court had to have such powers in order to enforce its rule of practice, suppress any abuses of its process and defeat any attempted thwarting of its process. The residual jurisdiction to reopen appeals was linked to a discretion which enabled the Court of Appeal to confine its use to the cases in which it was appropriate for the jurisdiction to be exercised.
See also Chu Tak Fai v Public Prosecutor  1 MLJ 201;  4 CLJ 931.
In Abdullah Idris it was a panel of three judges comprising James Foong JCA (as he then was), Hassan Lah JCA and Sulong Matjeraie
JCA. In the course of delivering the unanimous judgment of the Court, James Foong JCA posed the following pertinent question:
If r. 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court which is, and I repeat, similar to O. 92 r. 4 of the Rules of the High Court which applies mutatis mutandis to the Court of Appeal by virtue of r. 4 of the Rules of the Court of Appeal, cannot confer jurisdiction on the Federal Court how then did the Federal Court in the case of Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd v. Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance (Malaysia) Bhd  6 CLJ 1 derive jurisdiction to entertain a review of its own decision? Similar to the Court of Appeal, except for r. 137 the Rules of the Federal Court, there is no provision in the Federal Constitution, the Court of Judicature Act or any Federal Law conferring jurisdiction on the Federal Court to review its own decision.
The learned Judge then referred to certain passages of the judgments of Abdul Hamid Mohamad CJ and Zaki Tun Azmi PCA (as he then was) in the Federal Court case of Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd v. Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance (Malaysia) Bhd  6 CLJ 1 to explain how the Federal Court derives its inherent power to review its previous decision. That part of the judgment of James Foong JCA reads as follows (at p. 457-458):
In Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd v. Mitsui Sumitomo insurance (Malaysia) Bhd (supra), an application was made to the Federal Court to have a decision of the Federal Court reviewed and reheard pursuant to r. 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the court. Though Chief Justice Abdul Hamid Mohamad in that case initially reiterated that r. 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court does not confer jurisdiction, he conceded:
However, I accept that, in very limited and exceptional cases, this court does have the inherent jurisdiction to review its own decision. I must stress again that this jurisdiction is very limited in its scope and must not be abused. I have no difficulty in accepting that inherent jurisdiction may be exercised in the following instances: … (emphasis added).
Another member of the panel in same case, Justice Zaki Tun Azmi PCA (as he then was) though agreeing with the views of the Chief Justice that r. 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court confers no jurisdiction on the Federal Court to review or rehear its own case but since it is part of the court’s power to do all things reasonably necessary to ensure fair administration of justice within its jurisdiction subject to valid existing laws including the Constitution then “that inherent power is found within
the very nature of a court of law, unlike power conferred by statute” (emphasis added). But he cautioned:
There is no doubt that this court has that authority to allow this application. Whether it does so, depends on the circumstances of each case. This court has on many previous occasions decided that it has the right to order a review of its own decision to prevent injustice or an abuse of the process of the court. It has that very wide discretion. However, that wide discretion will not be used liberally but only sparingly, in exceptional cases and on a case to case basis where a significant injustice had probably occurred and there was no alternative effective remedy. The court must exercise strong control over such application. It must be satisfied that it is within exceptional category. (emphasis added).
Having referred to the above passages of the judgments of Abdul Hamid Mohamad CJ and Zaki Tun Azmi PCA in Asean Security Paper Mills, James Foong JCA then put the question (at p. 458):
If the Federal Court is possessed of such inherent power to review or rehear a matter that it has previously disposed off, what about the intermediary level of the Court of Appeal on a matter that cannot be taken further to the Federal Court?
Having posed the above question, the Court then referred to the English Court of Appeal case of Taylor v. Lawrence  2 All ER 353 where Lord Woolf CJ ruled that the Court of Appeal has residual jurisdiction to reopen an appeal which it had already determined in order to avoid real injustice in exceptional circumstances. James Foong JCA also referred to the English Court of Appeal case of Re Uddin (a child) (serious injury: standard of proof)  3 All ER 550.
Having referred to these two English cases, James Foong JCA proceeded to make the following ruling (at pp. 459-460):
 When a court is armed with ‘residual jurisdiction’ or ‘implicit or implied jurisdiction’ or ‘inherent jurisdiction’ for ‘the doing by the courts of acts which it needs must have power to do in order to maintain its character as a court of justice’ then I am of the view that the Court of Appeal is seized with jurisdiction, not from O. 92 r. 4 of the Rules of High Court but from a residual or implicit or implied form which naturally makes no distinction between civil and criminal cases. Such inherent power applies across the board save and except within the limited circumstances as forewarned by the authorities cited above.
However, at a later part of the judgment, the Court, as a matter of prudence, did caution itself (at p. 461):
 Aside from these particular guidelines, I must add that this court, as a court of finality for cases originating from the subordinate courts, must always bear in mind that only in exceptional and limited circumstances that such application be allowed otherwise it will open the floodgate for cases that had already been decided to be re-litigated. This would defeat the principle of finality in a case. Thus, when considering an application of this sort, I must echo the approach voiced by Justice Zaki Tun Azmi PCA (as he then was) that it should not ‘be used liberally but only sparingly, in exceptional cases and on a case to case basis where significant injustice had probably occurred and there was no alternative effective remedy’.
Encik Awang Armadajaya, however, either in his written submission or his oral submission before this Court, did not refer to any of these two cases (Ramanathan and Abdullah Idris). At the conclusion of his oral submission, when I asked him to comment on these two cases, he merely urged this Court to depart from these decisions. Can this Court as the Court of Appeal depart from its previous decisions? It is unfortunate that the parties before this Court, in the
course of submissions, have not addressed this issue. As I
understand the law, this Court, being the Court of Appeal, in civil cases, is bound by its own previous decisions (see Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd  2 All ER 293; P. H. Hendry v. George John de Cruz  15 MLJ 62; and Kwong Yik Bank Bhd v. Ansonia Management Associates Sdn Bhd  1 CLJ 337). But there are exceptions, as spelt out by the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in Young v Bristol Aeroplane, and they being –
(a) where its own previous decisions conflict, the Court of Appeal must decide which to follow and which to reject;
(b) the Court of Appeal must refuse to follow a decision of its own which cannot stand with a decision of the Federal Court even though its decision has not been expressly overruled by the Federal Court; and
(c) the Court of Appeal need not follow a decision of its own if satisfied that it was given per incurium.
In criminal matters, however, because a person’s liberty may be at stake, the Court of Appeal, apart from situations (a), (b) and (c) above, may also depart from its own previous decision if satisfied that the law was misapplied or misunderstood in the previous decision. That the position in the criminal jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal should be different from that in the civil is derived from the judgment of Diplock LJ in R v Gould  2 QB 65, 68-89. The relevant passage reads as follows:
In its criminal jurisdiction, which it has inherited from the Court of Criminal Appeal, the Court of Appeal does not apply the doctrine of stare decisis with the same rigidity as its civil jurisdiction. If upon due consideration we were to be of opinion that the law had been either misapplied or misunderstood in an earlier decision of this court or its predecessor, the Court of Criminal Appeal, we should be entitled to depart from the view as to the law expressed in the earlier decision notwithstanding that the case could not be brought within any of the exceptions laid down in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd  KB 718 as justifying the Court of Appeal in refusing to follow one of its decision in a civil case (R v Taylor  2 KB 368). A fortiori, we are bound to give effect to the law as we think it is if the previous decision to the contrary effect is one of which the ratio
decidendi conflicts with that of other decisions of this court or its
predecessor of co-ordinate jurisdiction.
In the case that is now before this Court, Encik Awang Armadajaya has not convinced me that based on the exceptions as laid out in Young v Bristol Aeroplane and R v Gould, I have a good and valid reason not to follow the decisions of this Court in Ramanathan and Abdullah Idris. Hence, this Court is bound by its previous decisions in Ramanathan and Abdullah Idris.
Now, coming to the case of Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim, relied upon by the learned DPP, at the outset it must be noted that this case does not directly concern the inherent powers or jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal. Instead it directly concerns the inherent powers or jurisdiction of the Federal Court to review its own previous decision. The judgment of Mohd Ghazali Yusoff FCJ in Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim that is being relied upon by Encik Awang Armadajaya, the learned DPP, in support of his preliminary objection, although not a dissenting, is only a minority judgment. The learned Judge had ruled
that the Federal Court has no inherent power to review its own previous decision. In the words of the learned Judge (at p. 447):
 It is clear that this court has not been conferred any statutory right to review its own decision. It is also clear that this court has no inherent power to review its own decision. The decision of this court on 29 January 2010 was final. The interpretation both on facts and law in that decision, whether it was correct or otherwise, are matters of opinion of that panel of this court. It cannot subsequently be reviewed, reheard, reopened or relitigated before another panel of this court.
Encik Awang Armadajaya contends that this judgment of Mohd Ghazali Yusoff FCJ is authority for the proposition that the Federal Court has no power or jurisdiction to review its own previous decision under any circumstances whatsoever. The learned DPP then argues that if the Federal Court does not have the inherent powers to review its own decision, in spite of the fact that there is rule 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court 1995, a fortiori, the Court of Appeal too does not have the power to review its own previous decision. The Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994 does not have a provision similar to Rule 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court, but the Rules of the Court of Appeal
have rule 4 which empowers the Court of Appeal to apply the procedure and practice in the Rules of the High Court 1980, and in the context of the issue at hand Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of the High Court is significant.
With respect, in considering the argument of Encik Awang Armadajaya, it is of importance for me to stress here that the view of Mohd Ghazali Yusoff FCJ is not shared by the other two members of the panel, namely, Zulkefli Makinudin FCJ and Heliliah Mohd Yusof FCJ. Both Zulkefli Makinudin FCJ and Heliliah Mohd Yusof FCJ, in their judgments, take the contrary position. They take the position that the Federal Court has the inherent powers or jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances to review its own previous decision where it is necessary to do so in order to prevent an injustice being occasioned or in order to prevent an abuse of the court process. Zulkefli Makinudin FCJ, in his judgment, said (at p. 405):
 I am of the view r. 137 cannot be construed as conferring upon the Federal Court the statutory jurisdiction or the new jurisdiction to hear any application to review its own decision. However, under r. 137 the Federal Court still has the limited ‘inherent power’ or ‘inherent jurisdiction’ in order
to maintain its character as a court of justice to hear any application or to make any order to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the court. There is an important difference between the nature of the inherent jurisdiction of the court and its statutory jurisdiction. The source of the statutory jurisdiction of the court is the statute itself which will define the limits within which such jurisdiction is to be exercised, whereas the source of the inherent jurisdiction of the court is derived from its nature as a court of law and that the limits of such jurisdiction are not easy to define. (See Sir Jack Jacob, QC ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court (1970) Current Legal Problems 23).
And Heliliah Mohd Yusof FCJ in her judgment said (at p. 488):
 The rule itself is being framed as a deeming provision. The words ‘… nothing shall be deemed to limit or affect’ means also nothing in the rules shall be regarded as limiting or affecting the inherent powers of the court. The ‘court’ of course is a reference to the Federal Court. The SG seems troubled by the source of the power. Is the deeming provision a legal fiction or statutory hypothesis. The term ‘inherent powers’ refers to the judicial powers of the Federal Court itself. ‘Inherent’ means it is intrinsic or organic to the judicial powers of the Federal Court and hence being so the Federal Court draws upon it in the limited circumstances prescribed in r. 137 namely to address injustice or abuse of processes. A
certain reserve of powers intrinsically remains with the court for the simple reason that the Federal Court is created by the constitution as a judicial organ at the apex of the judiciary. Hence by virtue of being at the apex it is only the Federal Court (and no other non judicial branch) that has to be the organ to deal with ‘injustice’ or ‘abuse of processes’. It is in that limited sense that the jurisdiction itself stems from the inherent powers, for the powers being intrinsic and organic to the judicial powers of the Federal Court, those powers may therefore be drawn upon as and when circumstances require. It therefore constitutes a separate exercise and more of a rectifying process. The exercise of that inherent power will only be triggered by an application made to it, upon which the court could said to become seised of it. In that sense it could be said to exercise an inherent jurisdiction.
It hardly need stating here that I am bound by the majority judgment in Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim rather than by the minority judgment of Mohd Ghazali Yusoff FCJ.
The learned DPP, Encik Awang Armadajaya, also submits that the prosecution had raised a similar preliminary objection in two other cases recently, where an application for a review of a previous decision by the accused person was made, the first case being an
application before the Court of Appeal and the other before the Federal Court. The Court of Appeal case is that of Azlan bin Alias v. Public Prosecutor, Court of Appeal Criminal Application No. D-09-22-04, whilst the Federal Court case is that of Abdul Razak bin Daleh v. Public Prosecutor, Federal Court Criminal Application No. 05-84-2009 (J). According to the learned DPP, in these two cases the preliminary objection of the prosecution was upheld by the Court. But according to Encik Awang Armadajaya, hitherto, there has been no written judgment issued in respect of any of the two cases. With respect, since there have been no written judgments, I am unable to accord any judicial significance to these two cases cited by the learned DPP.
I must also add that the majority judgment in Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim is consistent with a long line of precedents, namely, the following Federal Court judgments:
(1) Chia Yan Teik & Anor v Ng Swee Kiat & Anor  4 MLJ 1;
(2) Megat Najmuddin bin Dato Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v
Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd  1 MLJ 385;
MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun
 2 MLJ 673;
Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v PP  3 MLJ 517;
Allied Capital Sdn Bhd v Mohd Latiff bin Shah Mohd and another application  3 MLJ 1;
Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd v Kobchai Sosothikul
 1 MLJ 417;
Chan Yock Cher @ Chan Yock Kher v Chan Teong Peng  1 MLJ 101;
Chu Tak Fai v Public Prosecutor  1 MLJ 201;
(9) Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd v. Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance (Malaysia) Bhd  6 CLJ 1; and
(10) Badan Peguam Malaysia v. Kerajaan Malaysia  1 CLJ 833;
In Asean Security Paper Mills Abdul Hamid Mohamad CJ gave five examples of situations in which the Court may exercise its power of review. But it is important to note that his lordship also said –
Of course, there may be other circumstances.
In some of the cases cited above, the Federal Court, having ruled that it had the inherent power to review a previous decision of the Court in exceptional circumstances to prevent injustice and to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court, nonetheless, having considered the facts of the particular application before it, proceeded to rule that the application had no merit and accordingly dismissed the
application. But the judgments made it clear that the issue as to whether the Federal Court has the inherent power to review its own previous decision and the issue as to whether on the particular facts before it, the Federal Court ought to exercise its power of review in favour of the applicant are two separate issues. Needless to say, these two questions must be dealt with and considered separately in order to avoid any confusion.
In Asean Security Paper Mills Abdul Hamid Mohamed CJ and Zaki Tun Azmi PCA took pains to explain that the inherent powers of the Federal Court to review its own previous decisions are not derived from rule 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court.
In addition there is the Federal Court of India case of Raja Prithwi Chand v Sukhraj Rai AIR 1941 which ruled –
The Federal Court will not sit as a Court of Appeal from its own decisions, nor will it entertain applications to review on the ground only that one of the parties in the case conceives himself to be aggrieved by the decision. The rules which govern the practice of the Judicial Committee and of the House of Lords in matters of review govern the practice of the Federal
Court as well in India. Consequently no case in the Federal Court can be re-heard and an order once made is final and cannot be altered. Nevertheless, in exceptional circumstances, an application for review can be entertained. The Federal Court will exercise its power of review for the purpose of rectifying mistakes which have crept in by misprision in embodying the judgments, or have been introduced through inadvertence in the details of the judgment. It can also supply manifest defects in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or add explanatory matter, or reconcile inconsistencies. The indulgence by way of review is granted mainly owing to the natural desire to prevent irremedial injustice being done by a Court of last resort as where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard. But in no case however can a rehearing be allowed upon the merits or even on the ground that new matter has been discovered, which, if it had been produced at the hearing of the appeal, might materially have affected the judgment of the Court: (1886) 11 AC 660; (1836) 1 Moo PC 117; (1871) L R 3 P C 664 and 14 Mad 439 (PC), Rel. on.
The above judgment of the Federal Court of India has been cited with approval by our Federal Court in Chu Tak Fai.
In conclusion, based on local and foreign authorities, I am of the view that the Federal Court and the Court of Appeal have the inherent
jurisdiction or powers to review their own previous decisions in exceptional circumstances where the Court is satisfied that it is necessary to do so in order to prevent an injustice being occasioned by the previous decision or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court, particularly when that previous decision was made by the Court of Appeal sitting as a Court of last resort. The minority judgment of Mohd Ghazali Yusoff FCJ in Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim is, with respect, against clear, abundant and established judicial precedents. And I wish to add that the source of these inherent powers, as explained by Abdul Hamid Mohamad CJ and Zaki Tun Azmi PCA in Asean Security Paper Mills, and by James Foong JCA in Abdullah Idris, is neither rule 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court nor rule 4 of the Rules of the Court of Appeal read with Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of the High Court. As correctly explained by the Chief Justice of the Federal Court and the President of the Court of Appeal in Asean Security Paper Mills, rule 137 merely confirms or recognizes the existence of the inherent powers of the Federal Court: the rule does not create or confer the inherent powers; it merely serves as a reminder of the existence of inherent powers that are already there in the first place. The source of the inherent powers is
the judicial power that is vested on the Judiciary by the Federal Constitution, in particular, article 121. These inherent powers are powers that the Courts must have in order to dispense justice effectively and the limits of these inherent powers, as noted by Zulkefli Makinudin FCJ in Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim, are difficult to define and, indeed, I venture to say that the limits of these inherent powers can never ever be precisely determined either by the Courts or by Parliament. And in this regard I must reject the suggestion by the learned DPP that article 121 of the Federal Constitution read with section 50 of the Courts of Judicature Act limits the inherent powers of the Federal Court and the Court of Appeal, or that the article 121 read with section 50 does not confer any inherent powers on the Courts to review their previous decisions. Indeed, it is clear to me that neither article 121 nor section 50 diminishes the inherent powers either of the Federal Court or of the Court of Appeal. Article 121 confers the judicial power on the Courts, and the Courts in exercising that judicial power must of necessity have the inherent powers so that justice could be mete out effectively and in a meaningful manner.
Accordingly, I am dismissing the Deputy Public Prosecutor’s preliminary objection, and I shall now invite Encik Karpal Singh to submit on the merits of the respondent’s application.
[Preliminary objection dismissed; hearing to proceed on the substantive application]
(Dato’ Mohd Hishamudin bin Mohd Yunus) Judge, Court of Appeal Palace of Justice Putrajaya
Date of decision and judgment on the preliminary objection by the Deputy Public Prosecutor: 26 November 2010
Encik Karpal Singh and Encik Lim Chi Chau (Messrs Karpal Singh & Co.) for the respondent
Encik Awang Armadajaya and Encik Murtazadi bin Amran, Deputy Public Prosecutors, (Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the appellant