DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA
(BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN JENAYAH NO:Q-05-49-04
EMPATI ANAK MAT
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR .RESPONDENT
James Foong Cheng Yuen, JCA Wan Adnan Muhamad, JCA Sulong Matjeraie, JCA
The accused was convicted for murder and was sentenced to death by the High Court Judge sitting in Sibu, Sarawak on 26th June 2004. The charge against him reads:
“That you on the 13th day of August, 1998 at about 2115 hours at road one kilometer from the bazaar Tanjung Man is, Sarikei, in the state of Sarawak, did commit murder by causing the death of one CHAN TAU SOON (m), and that you have committed an
offence punishable under section 302 of the Penal
The facts are extracted from the learned trial judge ground of judgment. On 13.8.1998 at about 9.00 pm Chan Tau Soon (the deceased) and Fook Kong Min (PW6) were travelling on a motorcycle belonging to one Teo Tia Tsim (PW5) along a road leading to Tanjung Manis bazaar from the Jaya Fuda factory at Tanjung Manis, Sarikei. The deceased was riding the motorcycle while Fook Kong Min (PW6) was riding pillion. While on their journey, PW6 heard a sound, which he described as “phiang”. On enquiring from the deceased what the sound was, and being told “nothing”, PW6 requested the deceased to stop. On stopping, the deceased complained to the PW6 of feeling numb in his right hand and then of unbearable pain before collapsing. PW6 then sought help from a passing motorcyclist, Samuel ak William Jackson (PW7) who went to Tanjung Manis and returned with a police vehicle driven by Constable Hellery ak Tampang (PW8), together with another motor-cyclist Arman bin Hussaini (PW9). The deceased was put into the police vehicle and taken to the Tanjung Manis clinic, where he was attended to by the Hospital Assistant there, Mohamad Ali Fauzi bin Hassan (PW10), who testified that when the deceased was brought in at about 9.30 pm on 13.8.1998, he was unconscious with undetectable blood pressure but had a slow pulse rate. PW10 applied an intravenous drip to the
deceased’s left hand and requested that he be transferred to the Sarikei Hospital.
According to the PW6, the incident took place along a stretch of tarred road where there were no shops or residential houses, only bushes on either side of the road. PW6 said that when he and the deceased left Jaya Fuda factory that night, it was drizzling.
Dr Nelson Yap Chie Chong (PW3), the Medical Officer at Sarikei Hospital testified that on 13.8.1998 at about 10.30 pm, he examined a young man of chinese descent at the Accident and Emergency department of the hospital. PW3 concluded that the person he examined was brought in dead due to gunshot wounds because there were no vital signs from the deceased, no pulse rate, no blood pressure, no cardial monitoring and neurological reflexes. PW3 observed 6 bullet wounds over the body: 3 to the lateral side of his right arm and 3 other through and through wounds.
On 14.8.1998 an autopsy was conducted at the mortuary of the Sarikei Hospital, on the person PW3 had seen the night before. The autopsy was conducted by Dr. Myint Soe (PW22) a pathologist attached to the Sibu Hospital, while PW3 assisted him. Inspector Mohd Azmi (PW11) was also present during the
autopsy. Before the autopsy was performed, the body of the deceased was identified to all present by Lim Kok Peng (PW4), who was the uncle of the deceased.
According to PW22 as a result of his external and internal examinations of the deceased, he found that severe chest injury with massive bleedings from gunshot wound caused by 2 pellets to the chest was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death of the deceased. PW22’s testimony regarding the cause of the deceased’s death was not seriously challenged in the cross-examination.
On 14.8.1998 at about 2.00 am, Corporal Mahmud @
Hamdan bin Majidin (PW1) received a report about the death of the deceased from Teo Tia Taim (PW5) vide Tanjung Manis Rpt/36/98). At about 9.00 am on the same day PW24 went to the scene of the incident with a few police personnel and PW6.
He prepared a sketch plan (P24(A)) and took photographs of the scene.
In the vicinity of the crime scene, PW24 noticed footprints leading to and from a spot some 10 meters off the left side of the road, which PW24 believed to be the “ambush position” where the person who shot the deceased lay in wait.
However, the mud-blocks with the accused’s foot imprint were
not produced as exhibits at the trial because according to PW24 the mud blocks dried and cracked, causing the outline of the foot prints to be lost, but before the mud block cracked photos were taken of them, which photos were produced as exhibits P21(L), (M),(N) and (O). The police continued their investigation to trace the suspect in the murder of the deceased. The police made a search and inquiry in all the villages and factories in the vicinity area of the incident.
On16.8.1998, two shot guns were seized from Rumah Jugah, which belong to one Tawan and Mat anak Gabong (DW5); the accused’s father.
On 21.8.1998 at about 3.00 p.m, while at Tanjung Manis police station, PW24 received an anonymous telephone call from a member of public about an Iban father asking a teacher what will be the punishment could be imposed on his son who had mistakenly shot someone and had informed him that the son had disfigured lip. After receiving the said call PW24 did initial investigation at Rumah Jugah, and found out that DW5’s son had disfigured lip. On the same day, the police party went to Rumah Jugah and subsequently the accused was arrested.
On 29.8.1998, the cautioned statement of the accused (P19) was recorded by ASP Jackson @ George Johem (PW15). When the prosecution sought to adduce the contents of P19 as evidence, the defence objected to its admissibility on the ground that it was not given voluntarily. After trial within a trial the trial Judge admitted P19.
On 30.8.1998, based on information in P19, PW24 and police party brought the accused to the crime scene. At the scene, the accused pointed out to PW24 how he had made his way to, and left the ambush position, after the shooting. PW24 then prepared sketch plan (P25 (A) & (B)), and photographs were taken (P17 (a)-(g)). From the scene, the accused was brought to Rumah Jugah. The accused showed the police where he kept the shotgun and the cartridges after the incident on the night of 13.8.1998. A search list (P26) was prepared by PW24 and a copy issued to Mat anak Gabong.
On 11.9.1998, Lau Cheng Siew @ Low Cheng Siew (PW2) the chemist did firing 3 rounds on the cartridges seized by the police from Rumah Jugah using exhibit P11(a). PW2 made a comparison on the characteristic mark with those cartridges marked exhibit P9 (a) and P10 (a) and found them to be similar.
In relation to the shot gun (P11(a)) which PW2 had examined, although the shot gun was not in good condition he found it serviceable and managed to test fire all the 3 rounds using the same shot gun.
In summary, what the accused said in P19 was that on the day before the incident ( 12.8.1998 ), he was sending his younger brother to school at about 7.00 am when he met a former classmate named Kusaimi bin Kawi who jeered him about his ugly looks. The accused said he was deeply hurt by Kusaimi’s jeering which had been going on since their school days and so he decided to teach him a lesson for what he had done all this time. The accused said that on 13.8.1998 he decided to kill Kusaimi bin Kawi by ambushing him along a road leading to Tanjung Manis town. So at about 6.00 pm on the same day he took a shot gun owned by his father and departed from his longhouse on a motorcycle and headed for the road leading to Tanjung Manis town. According to him when he took the shot gun, his parents were not at home. On arrival at the place he selected, the accused said he hid his motorcycle at the road side then made his way to a spot some 20 feet away from the road side, where he took up an ambush position and loaded the shot gun with one of 3 cartridges he was carrying. According to the accused, Kusaimi usually went to Tanjung Manis town every night and the accused was able to recognize the light and sound of the motorcycle Kusaimi
frequently used. The accused said that it was dark and drizzling that night and that several motorcycle passed by his ambush position but from the sound of their engines he knew it was not Kusaimi’s. The accused said that at about 9.00 pm he saw and heard 2 motorcycles heading towards Tanjung Manis. He recognized the sound of the second of the two motorcycles which was travelling behind as that used by Kusaimi, so he waited until Kusaimi’s motorcycle was opposite him before he fired and shot in the direction of his target. The accused said he then observed the rider of the motorcycle fell down about 20 feet from where he had fired his shot. The accused said that on moving forward a little from his ambush position he heard voices speaking in Chinese from the spot where the motorcycle had fallen. It was then he realized that he might have mistakenly shot someone else. He said he did not go to check on that person as he was frightened. Instead, he made his way back to his longhouse (Rumah Jugah). On arrival back at the longhouse between 10.00 pm and 11.00 pm, the accused said he found his father fast asleep. He then put back the shot gun in the room where it was kept by his father. He also put back the cartridges and empty casing where they were kept by his father. The next day (14.8.1998) he overheard people talking about a person who had been shot dead the previous night. He then confided and told his father that on the previous night he had shot someone, not on purpose but by mistake.
I am satisfied that the trial Judge after holding a trial within trial held that the accused’s cautioned statement (P19) had been given voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement. When the main trial resumed, the accused’s cautioned statement was admitted into evidence through the recording officer; ASP George Joehem (PW15).
During the hearing of the accused’s appeal before this court his counsel Mr.Baru Bian contended that the trial Judge had erred in deciding that the accused’s cautioned statement (P19) was given voluntarily.He said the accused is an Iban and the Recording Officer (RO) is a Bidayuh. And there was no evidence that the RO was fluent in iban language. Mr. Bian urged this court to ignore P19 because according to him even though accepted, is of little value; it was Kusaimi bin Kawi that the accused intended to shoot.
Mr. Bian further submitted that the accused also emphatically denied that the statement was given voluntarily when he signed P19. He said that the accused in his testimony, pointed out that it was his signature appearing at bottom left of the pages in P19 but the accused was asked to sign on those without being told of the purposes for signing. According to Mr. Bian the accused was told to sign on exhibit PI9 because he was promised by TWTPW3 that he would be
released immediately. Mr. Bian said the accused was handcuffed and wearing only his underwear, without any shirt or trousers and was barefooted when he was brought before the police officer to whom he gave his statement. Mr. Bian urged this court to look at the accused’s testimony during examination in chief.
Upon perusal of the grounds of judgment I find that the trial Judge had considered the issue of voluntariness and the alleged oppressive circumstances (page 681 of the Appeal Record). Therefore I am not going to disturb his finding of facts as they were appropriately dealt. In his ruling (page 340 of the Appeal Record) the trial judge said that the handcuffs were removed from the accused’s hands at a point in time before he gave his statement remained intact and unaffected. It is my view that the learned judge made his finding of fact. See Francis Antonysamy v. PP  3 MLJ 389); In Juraimi Husin v. PP  2 CLJ 383, it was held that:
“A statement made under s.113 of the Criminal Procedure Code should be made voluntarily and the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the voluntariness of such statement beyond a reasonable doubt, the test applicable being partly objective and partly subjective. Once a confession based on such a statement is admitted, a
conviction may be based solely on its strength. However, as a matter of practice and prudence, the court ought to look for corroboration of the incriminating parts of the confession. On the facts of the case, there was nothing improper in the manner in which the statement of the first appellant was recorded by the officer in charge of the investigations. The statement was therefore made voluntarily – the product of a free mind, untainted by any illegitimate pressure.”
Mr. Bian further contended that the trial Judge had erred in his finding that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the injuries sustained by the deceased were caused by the accused and in admitting the evidence of a anonymous caller implicating the accused’s father, as this is a hearsay evidence. This anonymous caller never testified at the trial to corroborate what the Investigating Officer (PW24) had said on the matter. For this, adverse inference must be drawn against the prosecution under s.114 (g) Evidence Act 1950, for failing to do so.
Mr. Bian also drew attention to the evidence of the PW24 that three days after the incident, PW24 had seized two shot guns from Rumah Jugah, one of which (P11(a)) belonged to the Appellant’s father, Mat anak Gabong (DW5). P11(a) was
already in police custody when PW24 received the anonymous call on 21.8.1998, about an iban father with a son with a disfigured lip, making enquiries from a teacher about what the punishment could be if his son had mistakenly shot someone. It was this information that led to the arrest of the accused and to the subsequent cautioned statement given by the accused.
On the above issue the learned trial judge in his judgment said that, the accused led the police party to the 2nd room occupied by his parents in Rumah Jugah and retrieved three cartridges, two of which spent (P9(a) and P10(a)). The accused told the police party that of the two cartridges, he had used the rusty cartridge (P9(a)) to shoot the deceased. Both exhibits were sent to the Chemistry Department at Kuching for examination. The evidence of the Chemist (PW2), confirmed that P9(a) and P10(a) were fired from P11(a). PW2 also testified that the two pellets (which were sent to him in a bottle in envelope (E2)) were shot gun pellets of shot size ‘SG’. PW22 testified that he recovered these two pellets from the deceased’s chest during the autopsy. I also feel that this is a finding of facts by the learned trial judge.
Regarding the anonymous call which PW24 received, the learned trial judge said it was not possible for the prosecution to produce the caller as a witness. The prosecution did not seek to
rely on it to prove the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made. As such the learned trial judge was of the opinion that it was not a case in which adverse inference might be drawn against the prosecution under s.114 (g) Evidence Act 1950. My view is that the learned trial judge did not misdirect himself on this issue.
In Pang Chee Meng v. PP  1 MLJ 137, Abdul Hamid Omar LP said at page 140 regarding the said section 27 as follows:
“The rationale behind this section revolves on the basis that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given by the accused in custody some degree of guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence overriding the Criminal Procedure Code and other written law.”
In this case, the fact discovered concerns the place from where the spent cartridge that was used to shoot the deceased which was produced and the accused’s knowledge of that fact, and the information supplied by the accused relating distinctly to the fact thereby discovered was the information about which cartridge had been used by the accused to shoot the deceased
and where the accused had put the spent cartridge on his return to Rumah Jugah.
The evidence adduced by the prosecution pointed irresistibly to the conclusion that the two pellets recovered from the deceased’s body did come from one of the two cartridges. The admission of the accused that he had used one of those cartridges (rusty cartridge) (P9(a)) to shoot the deceased; that he had used his father’s shot gun (P11(a)) to fire the cartridge; that he fired the shot gun at the deceased at the crime scene on the night in question; that the pathologist (PW22) recovered the two shot gun pellets from the deceased’s body; that the Chemist (PW2) confirmed that the said pellets which he examined were shot gun pellets and were fired from P11(a) which he found serviceable. All the evidence above, tended to confirm and corroborate what the accused had said in his cautioned statement about how the injuries came to be sustained by the deceased, therefore sufficiently proved that the deceased died as a result of the injuries he sustained were caused or was the result of the act of the accused.
The learned trial Judge had sufficiently considered the accused’s cautioned statement (P19). He opined that in order to constitute the offence of murder, the intention to kill that must be proved is not necessarily an intention to kill an identified
person, it is sufficient if an actual intention to kill a human being is proved (Ismail bin Hussin v PP  19 MLJ 48; PP v Sainal Abidin Mading  3 CLJ 41). What was required is that the prosecution has to prove that the accused intended to cause death of the deceased. Since intention concerns the state of mind of a person, its existence is to be deduced from the evidence.
Reverting to the evidence that has been adduced in the present case, it showed that on the night in question the accused had set out from his longhouse taking with him his father’s shot gun. He then selected an ambush position along a straight stretch of the road, and then waited until he was sure that the person he wanted to shoot had arrived at his ambush position before taking aim to discharge the shot-gun at his target. The irresistible inference is that his intention was to cause death to that other person.
The accused also had said that he came to realize that he may have mistakenly shot the wrong person because when he moved closer to the spot where he saw the rider of the motorcycle fall, he heard voices speaking in chinese. As a matter of fact the deceased and his pillion rider Fook Kong Min (PW6) are chinese. The deceased and PW6 had conversed with each other before the deceased collapsed. While the accused said in his cautioned statement that on the day after
the shooting he had heard people talking about someone being shot, he did not say that he heard that it was a Chinese was shot dead. Unless the accused had been at the scene on the night of the 13.8.1998, he would not have the knowledge that the voices he heard were speaking in chinese so as to enable him to suspect that he had shot the wrong person.
According to the learned trial judge (page 714 of the Appeal Record), “the fact that the accused had said he wanted to kill Kusaimi bin Kawi, while it may provide a purpose or reason for the accused being at the scene of crime that night, and the fact that Kusaimi bin Kawi does not know the accused, does not in any way detract from the fact that the accused had an actual intention to kill a human being that night. Whether it was Kusaimi bin Kawi or it was Emran bin Husaini (PW13) whom the accused wanted to kill, the circumstances surrounding the shooting of the deceased, shows that the accused had an actual intention to kill a human being that night.
And the fact that the accused subsequently came to realize that he might have shot the wrong person would not in any way negative the intention to kill a human being because section 301 of the Penal Code provides that:-
“If a person, by doing anything which he intends or knows to be likely to cause death, commits culpable homicide by causing the death of any person whose death he neither intends nor knows
himself to be likely to cause, the culpable homicide committed by the offender is of the description of which it would have been if he had caused the death of the person whose death he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause.”
After perusing the learned trial judge grounds of judgment, I am satisfied that he had given due considerations to all requirements under the provision of section 300 of the Penal Code. The trial judge said that the deceased has been identified as Chan Tau Soon and the deceased died as a result of injuries inflicted by the accused. The accused had the intention to cause death. I am in agreement with his finding. See Tham Kai Yan & Ors. v PP  1 MLJ 174; Kenneth Fook Mun Lee v PP  4 CLJ 359.
In this appeal it is clear that P19 was admitted by the trial court after TWT proceeding and the court found it to be voluntarily made. It was admitted as a result of a finding of facts by the trial court. I am not going to disturb P19: see Francis Antonysamy v PP [Supra]. From the evidence in P19 coupled with the circumstantial evidence given by prosecution witnesses the learned trial judge found that prima facie had been made out against the accused. Again I find that the said judge came to the right conclusion.
For the above reasons, I am satisfied with the finding of the trial Judge that the prosecution had proved the element of ‘mens rea’ of the charge against the accused, and had established a prima facie case against him and called him to enter his defence.
The accused denied causing death of the deceased or murdering him on the night of the 13.8.1998. He then put forward an alibi saying that he spent that night with his father and mother as well as his auntie, uncle, grandfather and grandmother at their padi hut. The accused did not say where he was planting padi or where the hut that he had spent that night was situated, but he said the padi fields were about 2 hour boat ride from Rumah Jugah.
In his defence, the accused (DW1) said that a week before he was arrested he and his father (DW5) were at padi field’s hut at a place called Semujok to plant padi. He denied his presence at the crime scene on 13.8.1998. In support of his alibi defence he called four other witnesses. They were Tuai Rumah Jugah Ak Anjai (DW2), Chiki Anak Tawan (DW3), Timah Ak Remang (DW4) and Mat Ak Gabong (DW5). They were amongst a list of 13 names given by him in his Notice of Alibi dated 14.7.1999 pursuant to section 402A of the Criminal Procedure Code.
The learned trial judge in his lengthy and exhaustive grounds of judgment was of the opinion that the evidence of DW2, DW3, DW4 and DW5 did not have the effect of proving, supporting, corroborating or establishing in any way the alibi of the accused. He said the evidence show that the longhouse folk of Rumah Jugah, including the accused’s family own padi fields at Semujok and Menjawan which is situated quite far from their longhouse, which they would plant-up with wet padi in August of each year. Their evidence also shows that when they went to their farms, they would stay there overnight, but there is no conclusive evidence about how long they would remain at their fields, usually until their food rations ran out which usually lasted for about one week. But there was also evidence that even after 2 or 3 days at the farm, the longhouse folks would return to their longhouse if the need arose. With regard to the crucial date of 13.8.1998, the trial judge found that the evidence of DW2, DW3, DW4 and DW5 whether individually or together as a whole, was unable to establish that the accused was at his padi field on that date. According to the learned judge all of them are the accused’s relatives staying in the same Rumah Jugah.
According to learned trial judge for the defence of alibi, the accused only needs to establish his alibi on a balance of probabilities, (Dato’ Mohktar Bin Hashim & Anor v. PP 
2 MLJ 232). After having considered all the evidence relating to his alibi, the learned trial judge found that the accused has failed to establish that on the night of 13.8.1998, he was at his padi field but at Semujok. He rejected the accused’s defence of alibi.
On the submission by Mr. Bian that the trial Judge had erred in not accepting the evidence of the defence’s witnesses i.e DW2, DW3, DW4 and DW5 on the balance of probability as credible to prove, support, corroborating or establishing the defence of alibi, I feel they are devoid of merit. The learned trial Judge in assessing the accused’s credit at the end of the case for the defence, including what the accused had said in his reexamination, had found that the accused had not been able to explain the material contradictions between what was stated in his cautioned statement (P19) and his evidence in court and that his credits stands impeached. There was no conclusive evidence that what he said about him being at the padi hut on the material night. I am in agreement with the trial Judge when he found that what was said by DW2, DW3, DW4 and DW5 whether individually or together as a whole, did not have the effect of proving, supporting, corroborating or establishing in any way the alibi of the accused. With regard to the crucial date of the 13.8.1998 the evidence of none of the witnesses was able to establish that the accused was at his padi field on that date. In this case his defence of alibi failed to cast any doubt
on the prosecution’s case. My view is that the learned trial judge was right to hold that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as charged. It is my considered opinion that the trial judge did not err in his findings.
In this appeal the prosecution relied on the admission by the accused in P19 and other circumstantial evidence which the learned judge accepted. With regard to the acceptance of circumstantial evidence I would like to highlight certain authorities which our courts heavily relied time and time again. See Jayaraman & Ors v PP  2 MLJ 306; Dato’ Mohktar bin Hashim v PP [Supra]; Sunny Ang v PP  2 MLJ 195; Muniandy & Anor v PP  1 MLJ 179; PP v Mohd Bandar Shah Nordin & Anor  4 CLJ 859.
In Jayaraman & Ors. v PP [Supra], Suffian LP at page 308 quoted Thomson CJ said in Chan Chwen Kong v PP  28 MLJ 307 as follows:-
“That evidence was entirely circumstantial and what the criticism of its amounts to is this, that no single piece of that evidence is strong enough to sustain conviction. That is very true. It must however be borne in mind that in cases like this, where the evidence is wholly
circumstantial what has to be considered is not only of each individual strand of evidence but also the combined strength of these strands when twisted together to form a rope. The real question is; is that rope strong enough to hang the prisoner?
At page 309 Suffian LP had this to say:-
“ And there is no rule that, where the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence, the judge must, as a matter of law, give further direction that the facts proved are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused, but also as to be inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion.”
And at page 310 he stated,
“In our view the irresistible conclusion test only seems to place on the prosecution a higher burden of proof that in a case where it depends on direct evidence, for in fact to apply the one and one only irresistible conclusion test is another way of saying that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt ”
I do not find any misdirection by the learned trial judge on facts and on law. It is trite that an appellate court should be slow in disturbing a finding of facts by the trial judge unless such finding is clearly against the weight of evidence: per Nik Hashim FCJ at page 294 in Che Omar Mohd Akhir v PP  3 CLJ 281; see also Andy bin Bagindah v PP  3 MLJ 644.
With regard to the evidence of DW5 (the accused’s father) the trial judge directed his mind by giving due consideration that DW5 had used the two cartridges (P9(a)) and P10(a)) to shoot wild boar and monkey with. He felt that DW5’s testimony on how the two cartridges were used was inconsistent with the evidence adduced by the prosecution. He considered DW5’s evidence with suspect as DW5 was not independent witness.
The learned trial judge rejected the accused’s defence. He gave plenty of reasons in his judgment and he reasoned out why he did not accept the evidence of the defence witnesses. According to the trial judge’s finding the said witnesses are from the accused long house and padi field which the accused said he was at the material time, is only two hour boat ride. It is his factual finding that the said witnesses’
evidence as a whole or individually failed to establish that the accused was at his padi field on that night.
The trial judge also rejected the evidence of the accused as a mere denial. After giving due considerations to whole evidence before him, he found that the defence failed to raise reasonable doubt to the prosecution’s case. He also found that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. He found him guilty and convicted him. Death sentence was imposed on the accused.
For all the above reasons, this court unanimously dismissed this appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence of the trial court.
My learned brothers James Foong Cheng Yuen, JCA (currently FCJ) and Sulong Matjeraie, JCA having read this judgment in draft agree with the reasons expressed herein and to the decision given in this case.
(DATO’ WAN ADNAN BIN MUHAMAD)
Court of Appeal, Malaysia.
Date: 31July, 2009
For Appellant: Mr. Baru Bian Messrs. Baru Bian & Co. Advocates Kuching, Sarawak
For Respondent: DPP Awang Armadajaya Bin Awang Mahmud Kuching, Sarawak
Cases Referred To:
1. Francis Antonysamy v PP  3 MLJ 389;
2. Juraimi Husin v PP  2 CLJ 383;
3. Pang Chee Meng v PP  1 MLJ 137;
4. Ismail Bin Hussin v PP  19 MLJ 48;
5. PP v Sainal Abidin Mading  3 CLJ 41;
6. Tham Kai Yan & Ors. v PP  1 MLJ 174;
7. Keeneth Fook Mun Lee v PP  4 CLJ 359;
8 Dato’ Mokhtar Bin Hashim & Anor v PP  2 MLJ 232;
9. Jayaraman & Ors. v PP  2 MLJ 306;
10. Sunny Ang v PP  2 MLJ 195;
11. Muniandy & Anor v PP  1 MLJ 179;
12. PP v Mohd Bandar Shah Nordin & Anor  4 CLJ 859;
13. Chan Chwen Kong v PP  28 MLJ 307;
14. Che Omar Akhir v PP  3 CLJ 281;
15. Andy Bin Bagindah v PP  3 MLJ 644;