IN THE COURT OF APPEAL, MALAYSIA AT PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION)
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. R-05-15-01/2015
AKBAR ALI BIN ABDUL RAHMAN …APPELLANT
(In the Matter of the High Court of Malaya At Kangar
Criminal Trial No. 45A-01-02/2014
Public Prosecutor And
Akbar Ali Bin Abdul Rahman)
AZIAH BINTI ALI, JCA ZAKARIA BIN SAM, JCA AHMADI BIN HAJI ASNAWI, JCA
 The appellant was convicted and sentenced to suffer the death penalty upon the following charge:
“Bahawa kamu pada 12 Oktober 2013 jam lebih kurang 9.00 malam di tepi jalan berhadapan Kedai Celcom, Kompleks Tok Arau, Arau, di dalam Negeri Perlis, telah didapati mengedar dadah berbahaya iaitu cannabis seberat 9401.8 gram dan dengan yang demikian kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya, 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama”.
 The appeal before us was in respect of the said conviction and sentence.
 We found no merit in the appeal and dismissed the appeal without more. We now give our grounds.
The Case for The Prosecution
 PW-3 (Detektif Koperal Mohd Dahalan bin Yunus) acted as the agent provocateur in this case. On 10.10.2013, PW-3, who at the material time was attached with Jabatan Siasatan Jenayah Narkotik (‘JSJN’) Bukit Aman, had received a call from Detektif Sarjan Salim (‘DSS’) from JSJN Ibu Pejabat Polis Kontinjen Perlis (‘IPK Perlis’) relating to an information
received by DSS from his informer about drug trafficking activities involving a Malay male known by his moniker ‘Li’. DSS gave the phone number ‘019-5277640’ said to be used by ‘Li’ to PW-3 and instructed him to contact ‘Li’ and make an arrangement for the purchase of 10 kilogrammes of ‘ganja’.
 At about 7.15 p.m. the same day, PW-3 called the said number. The call was unanswered. However, at about 7.50 p.m., PW-3 received a call from the said number. PW-3 assumed an undercover name of ‘Abang Zan’ and the caller introduced himself as ‘Li’ during the conversation. PW-3 told ‘Li’ that he got his number from his friend ‘Man’ and enquired about purchasing 10 kilogrammes of ‘ganja’ from ‘Li’. The purchase price was agreed at RM1,600.00 per kilogram. PW-3 was told to call him when he is ready with the purchase money within a day or two.
 At about 8.40 p.m. the same day, PW-3 related his conversation with Li to DSS and ASP Meor. PW-3 was asked to meet ASP Mior at his office at IPK Perlis the next morning. PW-3 met ASP Meor at his office at about 11.30 a.m. on 11.10.2013. Before that at about 10.05 a.m., PW-3 had again talked to ‘Li’ to confirm about the availability of the said ‘ganja’.
 PW-3 next called ‘Li’ on 12.10.2013 at about 11.35 a.m. but his call went unanswered. At about 12.20 p.m., PW-3 received a ‘SMS’ from the said number, indicating in part: “Insyallah malam ni pukul 8.00 aku p kat hang lagi elok di Kuala Perlis”. PW-3 forwarded the said ‘SMS’ to ASP Meor and DSS.
 A briefing session was held at about 3.00 p.m. on 12.10.2013 at IPK Perlis by ASP Meor attended by, among others, PW-2 (Inspektor Abdul Shukor bin Yusoff), PW-3, PW-4 (Detektif Koperal Mohd Khairizan bin Baharudin) and PW-5 (Detektif Koperal Azhar bin Lazim). PW-4 was to accompany PW-3 as the ‘moneyman’ during the transaction. PW-2 was assigned as head of the raiding team. PW-5 was a member of a raiding team.
 On the same day at about 7.00 p.m. PW-3 received a call from the said number. He left it unanswered. At about 8.15 p.m. he returned the call and talked to ‘Li’. A meeting point to transact the ‘ganja’ was agreed at Restoran Yasmeen, Kompleks Tok Arau.
 PW-3 and PW-4 arrived at the restaurant at about 8.30 p.m.. At about 8.45 p.m. PW-3 received a call from ‘Li’ informing him of his arrival at the restaurant, wearing a blue ‘kopiah’ (skullcap) and blue shirt. PW-3 saw and identified ‘Li’ in blue shirt and blue ‘kopiah’ and hailed him to his table (herein after referred to as ‘the appellant’). PW-3 suggested that the appellant had dinner but the appellant declined. Instead the appellant asked PW-3 to follow him to his car. PW-3 said he will go alone as PW-4 have yet to finish his dinner. PW-3 followed the appellant to his car.
 Inside the car was a woman sitting at the front passenger seat and three boys sitting at the back seat. The appellant told PW-3 that the drug (referred to as “ikan” in their conversation) was inside the rear car-boot. When PW-3 again asked whether he had the drug, the appellant ensured him by knocking on the car-boot several times. PW-3 told the appellant that he had left the money with PW-4. The appellant then told PW-3 to wait at a tyre shop in front of the said restaurant. The appellant next entered his car. Thereupon, PW-3 gave the agreed signal to the raiding team by removing his skullcap and immediately left the place together with PW-4 who was, at all times waiting at the restaurant.
 Upon seeing the signal, PW-2 and his team members raided the car. PW-2 introduced himself as a police officer and ordered the appellant who was sitting at the driver’s seat to exit the car. A body search conducted upon the appellant found nothing incriminating. The team members then searched the car.
 Resulting from the search, PW-2 had found, at the spare-tyre compartment inside the car-boot, a garment bag branded ‘DIACOPPER’ (Exhibit P18) containing a black plastic bag (Exhibit P19) containing 10 slabs of compressed dried plant materials (“10 ketulan mampat daun-daun kering”) wrapped with transparent plastic tape. The appellant was thereupon arrested and handcuffed.
 PW-2 took custody of the appellant and the incriminating exhibits.
 The appellant and other occupants of the car were taken to IPK Perlis. The bag and the 10 slabs were marked with the letter ‘S’ and ‘S1 to S10’ respectively by PW-2 before they were handed over to the investigating officer, PW-8 (Inspektor Mohammad Fairiz bin Nawi), on 13.10.2013 at about 12.45 a.m. PW-2 had also lodged a police report
(exhibit P6) pertaining to the arrest of the appellant and the seizure of the drugs evinced at p. 305, Jilid 2, Rekod Rayuan (‘RR’).
 PW-8 had also put his mark on the bag with the letter ‘F’ and the 10 slabs with letters ‘F1 to F10’. The exhibits were kept in a locked iron cabinet inside PW-8’s room. The exhibits were taken out from the cabinet on 13.10.2013 at about 2.30 p.m. for finger-print dusting process and photo taking. The exhibits were again taken out from the cabinet on 14.10.2013 at about 8.00 a.m. for a media conference. The exhibits were finally put in a sealed box marked ‘M’ by PW-8 and handed over to the chemist on 14.10.2013 at about 12.18 p.m.
 The chemist, PW-1 (Puan Nur Izzati binti Suib) had analysed the ‘10 ketulan mampat bahan tumbuhan’ and found it to be cannabis within the meaning of s.2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1952 (DDA 1952’) (herein after referred to as “the said drugs”) weighing 9401.8 grammes. Her report is marked as exhibit P11, evinced at p.312, Jilid 2, RR.
 The defence had raised the involvement of a person named Mohd Adlin bin Abdul Rahman (‘Adlin’).
 PW-3 disagreed with the learned counsel’s suggestion that during the briefing session conducted by ASP Meor on 12.10.2013 at 3.00 p.m., ASP Meor had informed the briefing about the arrest of Adlin on 1.10.2013 and the present operation were made pursuant to the said arrest. PW-3 testified that he was never informed about the involvement of Adlin, or even of his existence.
 PW-2 as the raiding officer, also testified that he had no knowledge about the existence and involvement of Adlin.
 However, PW-8 confirmed that the appellant had mentioned about the involvement of Adlin. Based on the information given by the appellant, PW-8 found that Adlin was arrested on 1.10.2013 for a drug-related offence. PW-8 met Adlin on 12.11.2013 at Penjara Reman Pulau Pinang and recorded his statement. In his statement Adlin denied any involvement in the case as claimed by the appellant. PW-8 also testified that he had failed to trace Adlin at his home address after his release.
 At the end of the prosecution’s case, the learned trial judge had considered the evidence of PW-2 and PW-8 and dismissed any involvement of Adlin.
 The learned trial judge found that the prosecution had proven that the ‘10 ketulan mampat’ were cannabis within the definition of s.2 of the DDA, 1952 and there was no break in the chain of the movements, custody and handling of the said cannabis. The cannabis analysed by PW-1 and produced in court through PW-1 were the same cannabis seized by PW-2 from the appellant’s motorcar at the scene of the crime.
 The learned trial judge also found PW-3 to be a credible witness. He accepted the evidence of PW-3 who had identified the appellant as the same person known as ‘Li’ with whom he had been dealing through the phone for the drug transaction and the one he met at the restaurant. He also accepted PW-3’s evidence that the appellant was the person who had brought the drug and ensured him that the drug was inside the car-boot. He thus concluded that the appellant indeed had possession of the said drugs and he had committed an act of trafficking by delivering the said drugs to PW-3 (‘perbuatan Tertuduh membawa dadah berbahaya tersebut untuk diserahkan kepada SP3”) within the ambit of s.2 of the
DDA, 1952 (at para 14 and 15 of the Grounds of Judgment – at p. 256257, Jilid 2, RR).
 Having satisfied that the prosecution had established a prima facie case, the learned trial judge ordered the appellant to enter his defence.
The Defence of The Appellant
 The appellant gave evidence on oath. In brevity, the appellant testified that he was requested by his friend Adlin to deliver the said bag to Adlin’s friend named ‘Abang Zan’.
 The appellant testified that on 2.10.2013, he had received a call from Adlin asking for his help to bail him out. Adlin told the appellant that his friend would call the appellant to discuss on how the bail money of RM6,000.00 would be raised. The money raised would also be used to settle Adlin’s debt to the appellant.
 On 11.10.2013 at about 10.00 a.m. Adlin again called the appellant and told him that his friend would pass to him something to be delivered to Abang Zan at Arau, Perlis.
 On 12.10.2013 at about 10.00 a.m. the appellant received a call from Adlin’s friend. The appellant then met Adlin’s friend beside a highway at Batu Uban, Penang, on his way back home from work. Adlin’s friend showed him a bag and put the bag at the spare-tyre compartment in the rear car-boot. The appellant did not ask him the content of the bag. However, the appellant did open the bag and saw the black plastic bag but did not see its content. He explained that he did not see the content of the plastic bag in order not to breach the trust placed upon him by Adlin. He testified that it never crossed his mind that the said bag contained drug as he had never been involved in any drug activity or that Adlin would implicate him with such a horrible crime.
 The appellant went to Arau with his wife and children. He took his family along as they had planned to do some ‘hari raya’ shopping. They left home at about 6.00 p.m. and reached Arau at about 8.45 p.m. The appellant thereupon called Abang Zan who was already waiting at Restoran Yasmeen. He went to the restaurant and met Abang Zan. He
parked his car in front of ‘kedai Celcom’ nearby the restaurant. His wife and children were waiting inside the car. He did not bring the bag with him as he wanted to know Abang Zan first. There was another man at the table. He declined Abang Zan’s invitation for dinner as his family was waiting and he was already late for Isyak prayer. When Abang Zan asked him where is the ‘barang’, he went back to his car to get the bag. He went alone. During cross-examination, he denied asking Abang Zan to follow him to his car.
 Upon reaching the car, he entered and sat at a driver’s seat and pushed a button to open the car-boot. While still inside the car, the policemen raided the car. He was pull out of the car. The policemen searched the car but nothing incriminating was found. He was handcuffed and, together with his family, taken to Arau police station.
 The appellant came to know that the bag contained drugs only at the police station. The bag was shown to him at the police station. He told police about Adlin.
 At the end of the defence case, the learned trial judge rejected the appellant’s defence of an innocent carrier vis-a-vis the involvement of Adlin. The learned trial judge found that the defence was unreasonable, unbelievable and unacceptable.
 The learned trial judge opined that it is incredibly unbelievable for Adlin to orchestrate the transaction while in detention and for the appellant to simply agree to deliver the bag without knowing its content. The learned trial judge found that the defence of the appellant had failed to cast a reasonable doubt upon the prosecution’s case and thereby found the appellant guilty and convicted him of the offence as proffered.
The Grounds of Appeal
 During the submissions, the learned counsel had canvassed the following grounds of appeal:
I. No express affirmative finding of knowledge of the drugs by the learned trial judge;
II. Failure of the prosecution to call, offer or tender Adlin’s statement under s.112 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC);
III. Failure by the learned trial judge to apply the Radhi’s Direction;
IV. Doubts as to whether the alleged drug transaction ever took place on account that:
a. No call records or SMS adduced to corroborate the alleged transaction;
b. The glaring discrepancies as to what had transpired on 12/10/2013;
V. Failure by the learned trial judge to appreciate the defence’s case;
VI. The learned trial judge had misdirected himself in admitting hearsay and inadmissible evidence, which was highly prejudicial to the appellant;
VII. Non-production and/or suppression of CCTV recordings.
Ground (I) – No express affirmative finding of knowledge of the drugs by the learned trial judge
 Learned counsel submitted that that there was no credible and corroborative evidence to show prior negotiation for drug transaction to sustain the prosecution’s case of direct trafficking. As such, it was incumbent on the trial judge’s to make an express and affirmative finding of knowledge on the part of the appellant. However, nowhere in the trial judge’s grounds of judgment did the learned trial judge make any express affirmative finding that the appellant had the necessary knowledge of the contents of the bag (exhibit P18) or in other words that the appellant was in mens rea possession of the impugned drugs found in exhibit P18.
 It was further submitted that there was no shred of credible evidence from which the appellant’s knowledge of the impugned drugs can be inferred. There was no overt act on the part of the appellant to suggest that he had the necessary knowledge of the contents of the bag. The appellant never took out the bag from the spare-tyre compartment.
 The learned DPP submitted that the prosecution did not depend on the presumption under s.37(d) of the DDA 1952 but on direct evidence of trafficking by way of ‘selling’ and ‘carrying’ within the ambit of the definition of ‘trafficking’ under s.2 of the DDA 1952.
 Regarding possession, the learned trial judge, at the end of the prosecution case, upon accepting the evidence of PW-3 that a drug transaction had taken place between PW-3 and the appellant, had found at pp. 256, 257, Vol. 2 RR, as follows :
“ Saya juga pertimbangkan keterangan sama ada identiti Li sebagai orang yang membuat rundingan dan perbincangan jual beli dadah tersebut melalui telefon adalah sama dengan Tertuduh. Walaupun benar Tertuduh dan SP3 tidak pernah bertemu sebelum hari kejadian namun keterangan SP3 menunjukkan dia telah mempastikan identiti Tertuduh sebagai orang yang membawa dadah tersebut dan juga memastikan dadah berbahaya tersebut berada di dalam kereta yang dipandu Tertuduh. Saya menerima keterangan SP3 Tertuduh dan mendapati Li yang berunding dengan SP3 adalah Tertuduh.
 Pada akhir kes pendakwa ini saya dapati pihak pendakwa telah mengemukakan keterangan yang membuktikan Tertuduh mempunyai pemilikan ke atas dadah-dadah berbahaya yang menjadi perkara pokok pertuduhan. Saya juga mendapati pihak pendakwa telah berjaya membuktikan perbuatan Tertuduh membawa dadah berbahaya tersebut untuk diserahkan kepada SP3. Perbuatan ini adalah perbuatan mengedar dadah berbahaya tersebut seperti yang ditakrif di bawah seksyen 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952.”
 At the end of the defence case, the learned trial judge upon dismissing the involvement of Adlin raised by the defence, concluded that (at para 25, pp. 261, Vol.2, RR, of his Grounds of Judgment):
“ Saya berpuas hati bahawa Tertuduh telah mengadakan rundingan dengan SP3 untuk menjual dadah dan berikutan dengan persetujuan jual beli dadah tersebut Tertuduh datang menyerahkan dadah tersebut kepada SP3. SP3 juga telah mempastikan Tertuduh benar-benar membawa dadah kepadanya hasil dari rundingan jual beli dadah tersebut. Saya dapati keterangan pembelaan Tertuduh tidak dapat menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah ke atas kes pendakwa bahawa Tertuduh tahu barang yang dibawa untuk diserahkan kepada SP3 adalah dadah berbahaya jenis cannabis seberat 9401.8 gram.”
 Based on the evidence before us, we had no reason to disagree with the finding of the learned trial judge that “Li’ and the appellant is the same person and there was a negotiation for a drug transaction between the appellant and PW-3.
 We were satisfied that a reading of para 15 cited in para 39 above indicated that the trial judge’s had expressly made the finding of knowledge and direct trafficking. We found no reason to depart from the trial judge’s finding. We were satisfied that the evidence were overwhelmingly clear that there was a negotiation for a drug transaction between PW-3 and the appellant as indicated by the phone communication prior to the meeting between the two at the restaurant, and
later leading to the discovery of the drugs inside the car. We were also satisfied that PW-3 is a credible witness as was the finding of the learned trial judge. As such, we found no reason to doubt PW-3’s testimony relating to his telephone conversation with the appellant on the sale and purchase of the said drugs, although no documentary evidence was adduced to support such telephone conversation.
 It was our finding that the appellant had the custody, control and knowledge of the impugned drugs acquired through prior negotiation for the drug transaction and the subsequent meeting and discovery of the drugs from the car boot driven by the appellant.
 We, therefore, agreed with the conclusion of the learned trial judge that the prosecution had proved a prima facie case of ‘actual or mens rea possession’ and ‘direct trafficking’ under s.2 of the DDA 1952 and at the end of the defence’s case, the appellant had failed to raise a reasonable doubt against the prosecution’s case. Though the words ‘actual or mens rea possession’ were not used by the learned trial judge, that much is clear from his Lordship’s judgment. We thus allude to the following passage that appears in the case Chua Boon Hong v. PP  MLJU 1332 :
“ The second complaint centred on the failure of the learned JC to sufficiently appreciate the defence case and the failure to consider whether the defence of passive possession was available to the appellant. Now, we have perused through the grounds of judgment of the learned JC and we find that his Lordship had applied his mind to the evidence of the prosecution as well as the defence. The learned JC stated in his grounds of judgment that he was satisfied that the prosecution had proven a prima facie case against the appellant at the end of the prosecution’s case and therefore he directed the appellant to enter his defence on all the three charges. The learned JC too considered the issue of possession of the sling bag containing the drugs at great length and concluded that the appellant was in possession of the drugs as per the charges. And when his Lordship invoked section 37(da)(xvi) of the DDA, he was satisfied that possession had been proven. Although the learned JC did not use the words “actual possession” or “mens rea possession”, His Lordship had these in mind and it is reflected in his judgment. We cannot find fault with the style of the learned JC in writing his judgment. It is his own personal style and we acknowledge it in this judgment. His Lordship Akhtar bin Tahir JC (now Judge) addressed his mind to all the relevant issues and that is what that matters (Nur Azmi So’aib v. Public Prosecutor  1 LNS 1135).”
Ground (II) and (vii) – Failure of the prosecution to call, offer Adlin or tender Adlin’s 112 statement; and non-production and/or suppression of CCTV recordings
 Learned counsel submitted that despite the fact that throughout the case the appellant had strenuously maintained that he was delivering the bag to Abang Zan at the request of Adlin, the prosecution had failed to call Adlin or at least offer him to the defence.
 It was further submitted that the learned trial judge had failed to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution under s.114(g) of the Evidence Act, 1950 for the failure to call this material witness or to tender his s.112 statement recorded under the CPC.
 The learned trial judge in his judgment held that adverse inference was not applicable against the prosecution as sufficient effort to trace Adlin had been done.
 The learned trial judge also held that the failure by the prosecution to produce evidence by Adlin did not create a gap in the prosecution case as the evidence of PW-3, PW-4 and PW-2 were sufficient to prove the ingredients of the charge.
 The learned DPP had pointed out that the s.112 statement of Adlin was never referred to during the cross-examination of any of the prosecution’s witnesses including PW-8, during whose testimony the statement’s existence first came to surface. It was also pointed out that there was no application made by the defence to produce the statement.
 Under the circumstances, we found ourselves in agreement with His Lordship’s findings on this point. We found no basis to rule that the failure to produce the statement was tantamount to deliberate withholding of evidence of a material witness by the prosecution to frustrate the defence. A reference is hereby made to the case of Nanda Kumar Kunyikanan & Anor v PP  8 CLJ 406, cited to us by the learned DPP, whereby this Court had laid down as follows:
“ Under s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 the court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. The usage of the word “may” give the discretion to the court whether or not to invoke the adverse inference to a given set of facts. It is not a mandatory inference.
 Since time immemorial, the courts are reluctant to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution. The courts must be satisfied that:
(a) the witness that was not offered was a material witness;
(b) the prosecution purposely withhold evidence which it possessed and which was always available; and
(c) what the prosecution did was done with an ulterior motive to frustrate the defence.”
We found none of the above had any application to the appeal presently before us. Hence, there is no ground to invoke the adverse inference rule to operate adversely against the prosecution.
 It was submitted that the non-production of the CCTV recording at the restaurant which had been viewed by PW-8 during his investigation amounted to conscious suppression of evidence by the prosecution that must give rise to the presumption under s.114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 and had created a gap in the prosecution case due to the material contradictions in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies on how the event took place on the date of the arrest in particular whether the appellant went alone to his car or together with PW-3.
 In the same vein, we held that the CCTV recording was corroborative in nature and its non-production did not create a serious gap in the narrative of the prosecution’s case. It was the evidence of PW-3 and PW-2 that both the appellant and PW-3 went to the car. The learned trial judge was perfectly entitled to rely on the testimonies of PW-3 and PW-2 unsupported by the CCTV recording to make a finding that PW-3 had followed the appellant to his car where the drugs were found. We have no business to interfere with such legitimate exercise of powers.
Ground (III) and (v) – Failure by the learned trial judge to administer the Radhi Direction; and the failure by the learned trial judge to appreciate the defence’s case
 Learned counsel submitted that despite distinct and uncontroverted evidence proving the existence of Adlin, the learned trial had misdirected himself in not administering the Radhi Direction.
 Learned counsel also submitted that the learned trial judge did not judicially appreciate the defence when he appeared to have brushed it aside, without due consideration, premised on the notion that the defence cannot be believed and was a mere denial.
 However, we took note of the learned trial judge’s findings at the end of the defence case where the trial judge had this to say regarding the defence raised by the appellant, at pp. 266, 267, Vol. 2, RR:
“ Saya telah pertimbangkan pembelaan Tertuduh dan saya dapati pembelaan Tertuduh ini tidak munasabah, tidak boleh dipercayai dan tidak boleh diterima. Soal utama pembelaan Tertuduh adalah kewujudan Adlin dan peranan yang telah dimainkan oleh Adlin_
 Saya tidak dapat mempercayai bahawa Adlin mengatur segala-galanya kerana adalah jelas pada masa itu Adlin sedang berada di dalam tahanan. Keterangan pembelaan bahawa dia tidak mengetahui kandungan beg yang kononnya diterima dari seseorang ketika di sebelum datang ke Perlis tidak dapat dipercayai. Saya telah menerima keterangan
SP3 yang menunjukkan terdapat rundingan jualbeli dadah dengan seorang yang bernama Li dan saya dapati Li tersebut adalah Tertuduh. Keterangan SP3 bahawa dia mempastikan dengan Tertuduh dadah telah dibawa oleh Tertuduh di dalam kereta selepas bertemu Tertuduh di restoran Yasmeen dan ketika berjalan ke arah kereta Tertuduh tidak pernah dicabar melalui keterangan pembelaan Tertuduh. Keterangan ini membuktikan Tertuduh adalah Li dan Tertuduh tahu apa yang dibawa tersebut adalah dadah berbahaya. Jika benar Tertuduh menerima beg mengandungi dadah tersebut dari seseorang dan tidak mengetahui terdapat dadah di dalamnya Tertuduh akan mencabar keterangan SP3 bahawa dia mengesahkan kepada SP3 tentang dadah berbahaya yang dibawa terdapat di dalam kereta tersebut melalui keterangan pembelaan.”
 With due respect to the learned counsel, from the passage above, we found his criticisms on this issue unjustified. We have perused through the grounds of judgment and found that his Lordship had applied his mind and considered the evidence of the defence. We were satisfied that the learned trial judge had meticulously considered the defence and had adequately explained why he chose to disbelieve the evidence of the defence. In addition, the above findings are findings of fact by the learned trial judge. We were very mindful of our limitation sitting on an appellate capacity and thereby adopted the approach that we would have no business to mess up with such findings in the absence of a very compelling reason to find otherwise. We found none of the same herein.
Ground (iv) – Reasonable doubt as to whether the alleged drug transaction ever took place
 Learned counsel had raised the following points as infirmities in prosecution’s case that a drug transaction had taken place between PW-3 and the appellant :
(i) failure by the prosecution to adduce the phone call and SMS records of the mobile phones used by PW-3 and the appellant;
(ii) the glaring discrepancies as to what had transpired on 12.10.2013 i.e. (a) the time when PW-3 and the appellant met at the restaurant. According to PW-2, PW-3 had arrived at the restaurant at 8.35pm and the appellant arrived at at 9.00 p.m ; PW-4 said that the appellant arrived at 8.45 p.m ; PW-5 said it was 8.00 p.m. ; and, PW3 himself said he arrived at 8.30 p.m and he received a call by the appellant at 8.45 p.m ; and (b) discrepancies about the events preceding the arrest i.e. the whereabouts of PW-2 when the appellant was heading towards the car from the restaurant. PW-2 said he had followed and moved closer as the appellant was seen heading towards the car. PW-3 however answered in the negative
when he was asked by learned counsel whether PW2 was present when he was heading towards the car.
(iii) ASP Meor and Sarjan Salim were not called to testify in relation to the negotiation between PW-3 and the appellant;
(iv) It is very peculiar for the appellant to proceed with the drug transaction at a public place in full view of his wife and their four children;
(v) It is also peculiar for the alleged drug transaction that the appellant did not request to see the money and the agent provocateur did not show the money/flash roll (‘wang tunjuk’);
(vi) Discrepancies about the amount of money used as ‘wang tunjuk’ i.e. PW3 said the amount was RM16,000.00 while PW4 gave an amount of RM6,000.00.
 It is an established principle of law that an agent provocateur’s evidence requires no corroboration and that an accused person can be convicted on the uncorroborated evidence of the agent provocateur if the court accepts the truth of the evidence: see Wan Yurillhami Wan Yaacob & Anor v PP  1 CLJ 17.
 The learned trial judge found that the discrepancies between the evidence of PW-3 with that of the other witnesses were immaterial and minor and did not render the evidence of PW-3 unacceptable.
 We were with the learned judge. These are minor discrepancies and infirmities. It has no effect upon the core issue that PW-3 had negotiated to buy drugs from the appellant and that the appellant had indeed delivered the said drugs to PW-3 pursuant to the said negotiation and upon the terms of the said negotiation.
 It was submitted that the telephone calls made by PW-3 to the appellant and vice-versa relating to the said negotiation for the drug transaction were not supported by any documentary evidence. Hence it brings the reliability of PW-3’s evidence into question. Be that as it may,
in our view the seizure of the 10 ketulan mampat had fortified the testimony of PW-3, confirming the existence of the said drug transaction and the arrangement as to where the said drugs were to be transacted. It lent credence to PW-3’s testimony that there was an agreement between PW-3 and the appellant to transact the said drugs.
Ground (vi) – The learned trial judge had misdirected himself in admitting hearsay and inadmissible evidence, which was highly prejudicial to the appellant
 Learned counsel submitted that since Sarjan Salim was not called, whatever he said to PW-3 was hearsay. The relevant part of the evidence referred to were as follows:
Examination in chief of PW3:
“S: Pada masa yang kamu beritahu iaitu pada 10/10/2013, kamu bertugas sebagai anggota bantuan dalam satu operasi yang akan dijalankan. Boleh terangkan sedikit.
J: Pada 10/10/2013 saya mendapat panggilan daripada seorang
anggota risikan Jabatan Siasatan Jenayah Narkotik Ibu Pejabat Polis Perlis yang bernama Detektif Sarjan Salim, dia telah menghubungi saya dan menyatakan beliau telah berjumpa dengan pemberi maklumatnya. Dimana pemberi maklumat telah memberitahu ada seorang lelaki Melayu pembekal dadah.
S: Ceritakan apa yang berlaku pada 10/10/2013, tentang kamu sendiri
menerima arahan atau maklumat daripada sesiapa?
J: Pada 10/10/2013 saya telah mendapat satu nombor talian
‘handphone’ daripada Detektif Sarjan Salim iaitu anggota risikan
Jabatan Siasatan Jenayah Narkotik Ibu Pejabat Polis Kontinjen Perlis. Nombornya 019-5277640 yang mengatakan dengan meminta saya untuk menghubungi nombor ini dan membuat permohonan untuk membeli dadah ganja sebanyak 10kg.
S: Kamu ada menghubungi nombor ini?
J: Saya ada menghubungi nombor tersebut.
S: Kamu tahu nombor telefon ini kepunyaan siapa?
J: Saya mendapat tahu daripada Detektif Sarjan Salim bahawa nombor
ini adalah kepunyaan seorang lelaki Melayu nama panggilannya ‘Li’.”
 It was submitted by the learned counsel that the learned trial judge’s acceptance of PW-3’s evidence that the telephone number belonged to the appellant and that the appellant and ‘Li’ were the same person was tainted by reliance made upon the above quoted evidence which should not have been admitted in the first place.
 In this regard, we found ourselves in agreement with the learned trial judge’s finding that the appellant and ‘Li’ were the same person based on the identification made by PW-3 during the subsequent meeting at the restaurant and not solely on what was informed to him by Detektif Sarjan Salim. The learned counsel’s argument that the finding was tainted by reliance on the above quoted ‘hearsay’ evidence was therefore misplaced. In fact the appellant told PW-3 that he would be wearing a blue kopiah and a blue shirt. Consequently, PW-3 had identified the appellant and called
out for him at the restaurant through the said colour of the apparels worn by the appellant.
 For all the reasons given, we dismissed the appellant’s appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence handed down by the High Court.
Dated: 31st May 2017
( AHMADI HAJI ASNAWI )
Court of Appeal, Malaysia
For the Appellant:
Wan Azman Diman with Tanis Scivetti & Fazreen Hazrina Bt Rahman Tetuan Scivetti & Associates Peguambela & Peguamcara
For the Respondent:
Samihah Razali Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Jabatan Peguam Negara